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The Southern African Development Community (SADC) had at its inception a strong anti-apartheid political
orientation. From 1992, economic cooperation has been based on 'efficiency, economy and competitiveness'.
In 1996 SADC Protocol on Trade Co-operation for the creation of a Free Trade Area (FTA) was agreed and
the ratification process is almost complete.
Realisation of the full benefits of the FTA requires rule-based system institutional arrangements. The
institutional reform that could deliver a workable FTA is demanding. Moreover, the FTA, or more accurately
the 'intended' FTA, requires the application of strict rules of origin to succeed. Given the weak administrative
capacity of the member countries, it is likely that the 'intended' FTA would, in practice, operate like a
Customs Union with the Common External Tariff based on the lowest tariff rates prevailing for each
commodity amongst member states (CUmin). Against the forces moving for regional economic integration,
there are power forces from the international community leading towards unilateral freer trade, and ultimately
Free Trade (FT). These circumstances provide a rich background for exploring the options for regional
integration.
The central questions addressed in this paper are:
· What are the impact effects of the different routes towards regional integration in Southern Africa, the
'intended' FTA, the CUmin or FT?
· Does trade creation dominate dominate trade diversion under the 'intended' FTA? Is there trade diversion
under a CUmin?
· What are the possible terms of trade consequences of the different forms of regional integration?
· What are the likely dynamic consequences of the different forms of regional integration?
Impact effects were calculated for a 'intended' FTA, a CUmin and Free Trade (FT) using a 37 sector
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model. The paper concludes that a rapid move from an 'intended
but failed' FTA to an explicit CUmin offers many advantages to SADC. The CUmin strong impact effects for
SADC. Further, with the development of successful rule-based institutions under the CUmin option, the
2opportunities for dynamic long-run gains from deep integration are likely to be considerable, without carrying
some of the risks associated with FT.
This paper only marks a beginning of policy relevant research that can be informed by a CGE model of
SADC. This suggests that there is likely to be a high pay-off to further development of economic policy
modelling of the southern African region. Such work can only complement both case studies and political
economy research on micro and institutional aspects of the path towards regional integration.
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51   THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) and its successor, the SADC had a
strong anti-apartheid political orientation driven by the posture of the member states. Economic co-operation
was based on a sectoral approach. The Windhoek Treaty of 1992 changed the basis of economic co-operation
to allow for 'efficiency, economy and competitiveness'. This shift led to the 1996 SADC Protocol on Trade
Co-operation for the creation of a FTA.
In terms of economic conditions, the SADC countries are an extremely heterogeneous group. This can
be seen from Table 1 below. The gross domestic product (GDP) per capita ranges roughly 20:1 from richest
to poorest. In terms of economic size, the range is nearly 100:1. GDP growth performance over the last 20
years varied considerably, but some SADC countries had a surprisingly good record of economic
management, measured in terms of the average rate of inflation, and in terms of poverty reduction and human
development. A significant characteristic of the SADC region is the historically high level of trade barriers.
Whilst there has been a considerable lowering of protection in the SADC region in the 1990s, there are still
significant barriers to trade. Thus, the basis exists for the first steps to be taken towards regional integration
around the mutual reduction of trade barriers.
The two sets of estimates of average tariffs reflect the fact that several SADC countries underwent
World Bank/IMF Structural Adjustment Programmes or SAPs during the 1990s. Thus, there was an overall
fall in the average tariffs from 15.1% to 9.3% from the early 1990s to the most recent estimates. Although this
decline in the average tariffs was relatively large, the height of the tariffs that prevailed prior to the FTA are
nevertheless substantial, particularly in the SACU countries, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
As expected, the smaller countries have a larger GDP to trade ratio. The direction of trade statistics show the
SADC shares of imports and exports vary greatly from country to country. Thus, the direction of trade, the
height of tariffs, the sectoral structure of each economy, and the level of per capita GDP interact in a
complex way in influencing the effects of the FTA. An overall picture of the trade flows within SADC can
be seen from the last four columns of Table 1 showing the overall magnitude of the trade flows and direction
of the intra SADC trade compared with the Rest of the World.
2   THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR REGIONAL INTEGRATION
SADC has committed itself to an ambitious project of regional integration. The completion of this task will
cost SADC members a lot in terms of effort, loss of sovereignty and economic adjustment. Equally, the costs
of non-integration, that is the costs of not ceasing this historical opportunity for greater regional integration,
would potentially be high. They lie not only in foregoing all the gains from the agreed FTA, but also in a loss
of credibility should the agreed FTA fail and in the sacrifice of an opportunity to go further to a full CU
The SADC Trade Protocol as it stands embodies a limited ambition, but a FTA requires a rule-based
system to succeed. Otherwise, producers, traders and consumers will not be willing to take the FTA
seriously. If economic actors in the region are to plan their economic activities to take advantage of the
6Table 1.: GDP per capita, Tariffs and the Direction of Trade in 12 SADC Countries
9
GDP Tariffs Tariffs Imports SADC Exports SADC
per capita Early Most to GDP share to GDP share
` $USm current 1990s recent ratio Imports ratio Exports
1991-3 avg. Average % Average % 1991-3 % 1991-3 % 1991-3 % 1991-3 %
Angola 339 11.4 10.8 19.9 13.8 39.6 0.1
Botswana 2651 9.4 11.8 51.8 84.9 51.1 10.5
Lesotho 282 9.4 11.7 163.9 90.4 18.1 45.3
Malawi 204 22.9 20.6 24.5 40.7 23.1 13.3
Mauritius 2418 15.3 22.7 65.4 10.9 56.5 6.3
Mozambique 79 25.5 12.0 73.7 37.2 29.8 6.1
Namibia 1601 9.4 12.6 58.7 89.3 63.9 29.7
RSA 2985 9.4 5.6 12.9 8.1 19.2 27.0
Swaziland 914 9.4 6.3 94.1 93.9 74.3 53.1
Tanzania 161 24.2 19.0 46.5 2.0 20.6 2.2
Zambia 356 29.7 11.4 34.1 42.0 53.5 2.2
Zimbabwe 502 40.3 15.8 39.2 27.9 30.2 32.5
SADC 1103 15.1 9.3 19.6 26.3 24.1 21.4
Note: GDP is measured at factor cost. Estimates are from the World Bank Economic Indicators, 1998. These estimates of GDP differs slightly from earlier
estimates used in the model database (see Evans (1998a, Appendix 2)). The latter were retained in the model for consistency reasons. All other data are from
the model database described in Appendix 2 and in Evans (1998a, Appendix 2). The early 1990s tariff estimates are from Evans (1997).
7opportunities for linkages across the region, they must know that the commitments are real and irreversible.
The conditions for institutional reform that could deliver a workable FTA are demanding, and amount to a
requirement that inter-state economic relations be governed by codes of law rather than political pressures.
This process can be seen as a pooling, rather than as a loss, of sovereignty. If this argument were correct, a
failure by SADC to realise the FTA would not just lose the potential benefits of the FTA itself; it would
diminish the credibility of commitments made by the region's governments. It would also lose the potential
benefits from turning the region into a rule-based entity and the chance to move on towards establishing a
CU, or regional co-operation through Open Regionalism or OR. OR may be defined as a process of trade
barrier reduction towards regional Freer Trade carried out on the basis of Most Favoured Nation or MFN
tariff reductions. Each form of regional integration has a different level of mutual Co-operation, from
collaboration on infrastructure projects to establishing common laws and policies governing economic life.
With the possible exception of OR, the alternative forms of regional integration will require an
additional element of supra-nationality for SADC, in which member states can gain from the transition to a
rule-based economic environment. In each case, estimated costs and benefits of integration have both impact
effects and more dynamic consequences that are realised over a longer period of time. Both the impact and
dynamic effects are influenced by the global economic environment affecting the access of regional products
into world markets, the terms of trade, and the growth of the world economy.
The central questions addressed in this chapter are:
· What are the impact effects of the different routes towards regional integration in Southern Africa?
· What are the possible terms of trade consequences of the different forms of regional integration?
· What are the likely dynamic consequences of the different forms of regional integration?
3   TRADE CREATION AND TRADE DIVERSION
At the heart of the analysis of regional integration is the concept of trade creation and trade diversion. Terms
of trade effects are also potentially important when regional integration affects the level of exports to the rest
of the world (ROW). Thus, regional integration through tariff variation has a total effect that is the sum of
trade diversion and trade creation, less any loss of income through adverse terms of trade effects arising from
the over-all expansion of trade. In essence,
· Trade creation occurs when an economic union leads to the growth of intra union trade that exploits
comparative advantage i.e. when the union members experiencing expanded trade have relatively lower
costs than ROW suppliers.
· Trade diversion takes place when an economic union leads to an expansion in intra-union trade in which
the relative costs are higher than those of competitor countries in the ROW. That is, where the expanded
intra trade is against comparative advantage.
8It follows from the above that the static or impact effect of economic union is to improve members' welfare
when trade creation outweighs trade diversion. This statement is qualified in three important ways. First,
when the trade expansion worsens the terms of trade of members of the economic union, the union could
lower welfare, even when the benefits from trade creation outweighs the losses from trade diversion. Second,
the welfare of a CU is dependent on the height of the common external tariff.  A CU that is predominantly
trade diverting, and therefore welfare worsening can, by appropriate choice of the common external tariff, be
transformed into a gainful and predominantly trade creating CU. Finally, regional integration involves possible
dynamic benefits, many of which are difficult to quantify. The empirical results reported focus on the impact
effects with qualitative and back-of-the-envelope estimates of some possible dynamic effects added in an ad
hoc manner.
4   THE OPTIONS FOR REGIONAL INTEGRATION
In principle, there are three basic options to consider:
· Free Trade Area (FTA). This applies when existing tariff structures applicable to non-member countries
or the ROW are maintained as SADC moves towards FT within the group. Typically, rules of origin have
to be applied to a FTA to prevent importation through the country with the lowest tariff for a particular
sector.
· Customs Union (CU). The central difference between a CU and a FTA is that the CU has a common
external tariff, thus dispensing with the need for rules of origin. However, of central importance is the
height of the common external tariff. As already noted, the higher the common external tariff, the greater
is trade diversion and the greater the chance that the CU will be welfare contracting. Over-all economic
gain can always be achieved by setting a low enough common external tariff.
· Open Regionalism (OR) or FT. This may be just freer trade achieved by reducing trade barriers on a
MFN trading basis.  Alternatively, it may be expressed through the ultimate objective of FT. It envisages
a bargaining process concentrating initially on co-ordinated MFN trade policy reforms amongst the key
member states.
As already noted, a SADC FTA is critically dependent upon the successful operation of the rules of origin,
whereby imports into a member state cannot be transhipped through another to realise the benefits of the
lowest external tariff for a particular product within the FTA. However, it is likely that the administrative
capacity of SADC customs authorities will be very weak. It is therefore unlikely that the rules of origin will
be enforceable. If this observation is correct, then a SADC FTA will operate more or less as a CU in which
the common external tariff is formed by the lowest tariff on each commodity in each of the member states of
the proposed FTA. For simplicity this is called the CUmin. It is perhaps for this reason that just as ratification
of the SADC FTA is about to be completed, moves are being made for a move on to a SADC CU. Thus,
there are really two FTAs. The 'intended' FTA is interpreted as if the rules of origin could be strictly
9enforced without cost. The 'real' FTA with unenforceable rules of origin will be very much the same as the
CUmin that resulted from the application of the minimum tariff on any item for all member countries as the
common external tariff for that item. A CUmin would in fact have a low external tariff, an obvious advantage
for minimising trade diversion. In the SADC context, FT without co-ordination or negotiation with trading
partners is the logical outcome of a trade policy reform process under World Bank Structural Adjustment
Programmes (SAPs) or under the World Trade Organisation (WTO). It is therefore appropriate to develop an
analytical framework within which the impact effects of each of the options discussed can be modelled. This
facilitates the analysis of the effects of each form of regional integration on potential welfare gains and
potential dynamic effects.
5   METHODOLOGY USED IN THIS STUDY
The initial work on the impact of the SADC FTA for SADC (Evans (1997)) relied on a simple partial
equilibrium model and weak data set. The data set was greatly improved in Evans (1998a), but the earlier
partial equilibrium methodology was retained. An extension to a CGE framework was reported in Evans
(1998b, 1999b forthcoming), and is also used in this study. The additional data requirements for the CGE
version of the model, over and above the partial equilibrium version, were mainly on the demand side, and
input/output coefficients. Whilst these data were assembled using strong assumptions, the main structural
differences between SADC countries were preserved. Thus, it was judged that the extended data set was
adequate for a first general equilibrium exploration of SADC integration.
Over all, the CGE model is based on 12 SADC countries and 37 productive sectors for each country.
There were 9 agricultural sectors, a mining sector, one non-traded service sector, and 26 manufacturing and
mining sectors. The production and trade data are for the early to mid-1990s, and the tariff data are for the
most recent year available. The database is described in Evans (1998a and 1999b).
Some of the key assumptions and structural characteristics built into the general equilibrium model
include:
· Armington functions on the import side where the share of imports in total supply of a tradable good is
inversely related to the price of imports relative to the price of domestic production. Similarly, imports
from within the SADC region and from the ROW are treated as imperfectly substitutable and responsive
to relative price changes. It is therefore possible to use the Armington functions to construct a composite
import commodity made up of imports from within SADC and from the ROW, and for this composite
import to be imperfectly substitutable with import competing production. The composite importable
commodity enters into domestic demand in a straightforward manner.
· Perfectly elastic supply of goods in each sector. Where there is excess capacity, both micro assumptions
are likely to be good approximations. For agriculture, mining and manufacturing sectors operating close
to full capacity, the supply response is likely to be exaggerated in a relative sense compared with what it
would be with supply constraints being modelled.
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· A mark-up model of domestic cost formation. The mark-up is on wages and intermediate input costs. The
model assumes fixed coefficients in production for labour, as well as the more usual assumption of fixed
proportions for intermediate inputs.
· A macro expenditure adjustment is made to maintain a full employment at the initial constant wage.
Balance of payments equilibrium is maintained via variation of the real exchange rate.
· Government expenditure and investment was held constant, whilst consumer demand and intermediate
demand varied through price and income change.
· A micro-based welfare function was constructed, based on an estimate of the consumer surplus change
net of estimated intermediate demand less the loss of tariff revenue and the lump sum tax or subsidy
required to maintain macro economic balance.
· An attempt was made to estimate SADC price elasticities of demand for exports to the ROW. This
exercise was entirely unsatisfactory. Given the underlying weakness of these data, sensitivity tests were
carried out.
· Solution of the model was achieved with a Gauss-Seidel iterative procedure.
· Details of the data sources can be found in Evans (1996).
6   SPECIFYING THE OPTIONS
6.1  A FTA
Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article XXIV, members of the GATT/WTO
when forming a FTA are constrained in how the external tariffs are set. They must be set on a MFN basis
and the external tariffs and other trade regulations shall not be higher than those existing prior to the FTA.
The existing member country tariffs towards ROW countries remain as before, and the intra FTA tariffs are
reduced to zero. The rules of origin are required to back up this arrangement, preventing individual economic
agents from importing goods into the country with the lowest ROW tariff for that item and trans-shipping
within the FTA without further tariff charges. This FTA is also referred to as the 'intended' FTA to allow for
the FTA 'actual', where the rules of origin are unenforceable, discussed in section 6.3 below.
6.2  Determining the  Common External  Tar i f f
For GATT/WTO members forming a CU under GATT Article XXIV, the external tariffs must also be set
on a MFN basis. Further, the common external tariff must not increase. One way of defining the common
external tariff for a CU would be to choose for each commodity the highest tariff of the member countries,
or CUmax. However, this method would fall foul of GATT Article XXIV whereby the common external
tariff should not increase. A second method of forming the common external tariff would be to average the
individual tariff items for the member countries, or CUavg. The CUavg would be less likely to fall foul of
Article XXIV since there is some ambiguity in the definition of what is an increased tariff. Finally, the
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common external tariff could be formed by taking, for each traded item, the lowest of the member country
tariffs and applying that as the common external tariff, or CUmin. The CUmin is unambiguously consistent
with GATT Article XXIV. Compared with the CUmax and CUavg alternatives, of the CUmin is more likely
to produce an overall welfare gain1. The CUmin was therefore adopted for the CU experiments carried out.
6.3  Unenforceable  Rules  of  Origin
One of the characteristics of SADC already noted is that member states have a weak capacity to enforce the
rules of origin of the proposed FTA. In practice, the importers will seek to route their imports through the
country with the lowest relevant sectoral tariff with scant regard to the formal customs requirements. Thus,
the proposed FTA could turn out to operate as if it had a common external tariff chosen on the basis, for
each sector, of the lowest sectoral tariff amongst member countries. That is, the FTA 'actual' with
unenforceable rules of origin will in fact operate as the CUmin defined in section 6.2 above. This is to be
compared with the FTA 'intended' as defined in section 6.1.
6.4  Open regional ism defined
The hallmark of OR, compared with both the FTA and a CU, is that the negotiated tariff reductions are all
MFN. That is, parties to an OR agreement undertake to pass on any negotiated tariff reductions to third party
members of the WTO. Whilst it may appear that the MFN constraint takes away the incentive for member
countries to negotiate tariff reduction, this is not necessarily the case. For example, the MFN constraint
creates an incentive for member states to negotiate tariff reductions which maximise the growth of regional
trade without 'passing on' the benefits to third parties. Within OR, other areas of co-operation may be
identified, for example over foreign investment, technology or infrastructure. However, in all of these
endeavours, OR is a co-operative arrangement rather that a rule-based community set up under GATT article
XXIV as is the case with a FTA or a CU.
In the SADC context, there has been a long history in the 1990s whereby member states have
unilaterally lowered tariffs under the auspices of World Bank SAPs, or under the auspices of the WTO. As a
first exercise to explore the OR option, the simple assumption is that all intra and ROW tariffs are removed.
That is, to simulate FT.
                                                
1  As noted by Kemp and Wan (1976), it is always possible to define a CU for which trade creation dominates trade
diversion. The welfare gains from a Cumin are positive, the common external tariff is formed by an easy rule. No
check was made for the sign of the welfare charge for a CUavg or CUmax.
12
Chart  1  Regiona l i sa t ion  Opt ions  Compared
















0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0











7   QUANTIFYING THE OPTIONS
7.1  Comparat ive  s tat ic  wel fare  ef fects :
With net trade creation from freer regional trade, SADC countries will transfer resources from lower
productivity to higher productivity activities. This takes place without any change in the productivity of
individual sectors. Employment fixed in wage units for each economy means that in the present formulation
of the model there is no allowance for possible changes in economy-wide unemployment with freer trade. In
so far as there is economy-wide unemployment that could be lowered with freer trade, the welfare estimates
of FT will be downward biased. With employment in wage units fixed in each economy, there can
nevertheless be minor variation in the implied level of employment, as analysed in Evans (1999a). The
implied variations in employment are not discussed here since accounting for them here does not affect the
discussion of the overall gains from freer.
For each of the options FTA 'intended', the CUmin and FT, the estimates of the comparative static
welfare changes compared with the base period are shown in Chart 1, with the addition of calculations with
'large' and 'low' export elasticities.
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Table  2  Trade  Crea t ion  and  Trade  Divers ion
   Change in Trade Flows
% Increase % Increase
SADC Trade ROW Trade
FTA large 9.4 -0.7
FTA low 9.2 -0.5
Cumin large 7.2 6.8
Cumin low 7.3 5.2
FT large 6.5 11.7
FT low 6.8 9.1
Note: % increase in trade calculated as the change in imports
It can be readily seen from Chart 1 that the 'low' and 'large' export elasticities assumption does not alter
greatly the welfare gain for the FTA 'intended' of a little over 0.10% of initial Final Demand2. For the CUmin
and FT with large export elasticities, the comparative static gains increase greatly to nearly 0.50% and to over
0.60%, respectively. However, with 'low' export elasticities, the gains fall dramatically, particularly for FT, to
very similar orders of magnitude to the FTA 'intended'. Thus, provided the export elasticities are large, the
gains from trade would appear to be much larger for FT compared with the FTA 'intended'. It would
therefore appear that the neo-classical presumptions on the gains from freer trade that inform both World
Bank and WTO thinking are correct.
7.2  Trade Creat ion and Trade Divers ion
It is of some interest to explore the implications of the results for trade creation and trade diversion. There
are a number of ways in which trade creation and trade diversion can be measured. A simple indirect measure
is to see if either the FTA or the CUmin produce welfare gains. The presence of welfare gains implies that
trade creation dominates trade diversion. Another way of looking at trade creation and trade diversion is to
compare the changes in aggregate intra trade flows under the FTA and FT, or CUmin and FT, when all
changes are measured as % changes on base. Another measure, commensurate with the trade flows, is the
change in gross output under FTA or CUmin compared with FT. Alternatively, either sectoral employment or
GDP changes could be used. In the discussion below, all measures are used.
The fact that, for all three options for regional integration considered, suggests that there are positive
gains as shown in Chart 1, suggesting that trade creation dominates trade diversion, also found in studies of
other regional associations (see Robinson and Thierfelder, 1999). Another way of looking at trade creation and
                                                
2  The higher gain for the 'low' elasticities comes about because under the FTA, exports to the ROW decline a little. In
this case, the terms of trade are slightly better with 'low' compared with 'large' export elasticities, the opposite to what
happens for either CUmin or FT.
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Table  3  Trade  Creat ion  and Trade  Divers ion :  Regress ion  Est imates
A.
Dependent Variable:  dGDP (FTA)
Independent Variable:  dGDP (FT)
R Square 0.09
Adjusted R Square 0.08 Estimate S. E. t Statistic
Standard Error 0.65 Intercept -0.03 0.03 -0.94
Observations 444 Coefficient 0.08 0.01 6.41
B.
Dependent Variable:  dGDP (CUmin)
Independent Variable:  dGDP (FT)
R Square 0.91
Adjusted R Square 0.91 Estimate S. E. t Statistic
Standard Error 0.55 Intercept 0.00 0.03 0.02
Observations 444 Coefficient 0.69 0.01 65.36
 trade diversion is through the changes in aggregate intra SADC trade, shown in Table 2, together with the
over-all changes in SADC and ROW trade3.
It can be seen from Table 2 that the expansion in SADC trade is quite similar under all of the regional
integration options considered. The Table 3 findings on the changes in SADC appear to confirm that a great
deal of intra trade expansion would take place anyway under FT, and that the rise in intra trade is only 1/3
greater than under the FTA than under FT. Thus, the aggregate intra trade flow changes also appear to
confirm the observation that trade creation dominates trade diversion. A closer examination of trade creation
and trade diversion can be made using the 7-sector disaggregation of the model. The results are shown in
Appendix Tables A.7, A.8, A.9 and A10. The estimates of sign of the employment change in each sector for
the FTA measured as a % of the base levels, compared with FT sector employment changes also measured
as a % of base levels, suggest that there is trade diversion for the aggregate mining and manufacturing
sectors. On the other hand, there was trade creation for agriculture and services. The amount of trade
diversion dramatically falls when the employment changes for CUmin are compared with the FT changes.
With a large number of sectors and comparisons to be made, an obvious way to summarise the results is
to use regression analysis on the 37-sector results. Thus, for each option, the change in gross output,
employment and GDP in each industry in each country was estimated. The FT results were then treated as
the independent variable, the case where there is only trade creation by definition. The changes in gross
                                                
3  For SADC, the increase in intra imports and the increase in exports must be the same. This means that the increase
in ROW imports and exports must also be the same. For simplicity, the increase in trade is shown as a % of initial
imports. This choice of denominator makes no difference for SADC trade, since both the level of change in imports
and exports must always be the same. However, for the ROW trade, usually initial imports are greater than initial
exports so that the measure of increased trade chosen is downward biased compared with other averages of initial
trade with the ROW.
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Table  4 .  S ta t ic  and Dynamic  Ef fects  o f  Regional  Integrat ion
Large export elasticities
               % Final Demand
FTA              0.4%
CUmin             2.0%
FT             2.5%
output, employment and GDP were then treated as the dependent variable for the FTA and CUmin,
respectively. Formally, the linear regressions fitted were:
dTCij = a (TCij) + b (TCij) dTCik +ei
where dTCij is the measure of trade creation, a vector of sectoral changes
a (TCij), b (TCij) are the intercept and slope terms of the regression equation
ei is the error term
i = GDP, employment are the vectors of sectoral GDP or employment change
j = FTA or CUmin
k = FT
The regression results were very similar when using employment or GDP changes; the regression equations
fitted were hardly significant for the changes in gross output. Since the measure of trade creation and trade
diversion using changes in GDP is probably nearest to the desired theoretical measure, these regressions are
shown in Table 3. The regression results suggest that trade creation is weak compared with trade diversion
under the FTA. Although statistically significant, regression coefficient is very small. However, under the
CUmin the regression coefficient is very much larger and highly significant statistically. Thus, on static
welfare grounds, the FTA option is dominated by the CUmin and FT options. The question therefore arises:
are there excluded factors that may drive reasonable policy makers to adopt either the FTA or the CUmin in
preference to FT?
7.3  Dynamic Effects
A more extended discussion of the dynamic effects can be found in Mandaza et al (1998) and Evans (1999b).
The argumet is summarized here.
Typically, the dynamic effects can be divided into:
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(i) Scale economies and productivity effects
Within SADC, there are widespread opportunities for reaping scale economies outside traditional heavy
industry, including the better use of infrastructure. When combined with productivity effects from trade
creation and increased inducements for networking, this effect is likely to be very large. Typically, these
effects are associated with increased intra trade.
(ii) Reinvestment of initial gains
SADC economies have traditionally had low rates of investment and low rates of utilisation of existing
investment. If some of the excess capacity that exists in the region is taken up, and when a substantial part of
the gains from freer trade are re-invested, faster growth can be expected. These gains are particularly likely to
be realised when wider measures affecting the investment environment, such as greater certainty, are
implemented.
It is difficult to estimate the size of the dynamic gains without explicit modelling of these effects,
especially since the options considered here have different implications for the size and composition of intra
SADC trade, including different capital requirements of expansion of output. However, very rough orders of
magnitude of these effects range from four to six times the impact effects. Thus, taking the lower estimate of
four times the impact effects, the total welfare effects could be of the orders of magnitude shown in Table 4.
The very approximate measures of the mix of impact effects, once-and-for-all dynamic changes, and
dynamic benefits that continue into the future should be treated with great caution. In particular, the CUmin
and FT imply a very different sectoral mix of output. Thus, it is not clear that the very approximate estimates
of the dynamic gains as a multiple of the impact gains for the FTA would carry over to the CUmin or FT.
Nevertheless, measures suggest that the potential benefits of regional integration in SADC are large indeed.
7.4  Deep Integrat ion 4
Regional economic integration can add to the process of multilateral liberalisation when there is a
commitment to a deeper form of integration going beyond just the WTO framework. The idea of 'deep
integration', recently developed by Lawrence (1996), offers a simple but powerful insight into the relationship
between pure trade liberalisation and policy co-ordination. Thus, the initial trade liberalisation alone under the
FTA may bring small benefits. However, as already noted, the 'intended' FTA is unlikely to succeed because
of unenforceable rules of origin. If fully implemented, the FTA is likely to end up behaving like the CUmin.
Thus, for credibility, the FTA needs to move on quickly to something like the CUmin. Without a progression
from the FTA, there will be unenforceable rules of origin at the core of the regional cooperation
arrangement. Once credibility has been restored with, say, a CUmin, the benefits of specialisation, investment
and growth effects will fully appear. A question therefore arises, would it be possible to go from a regional
                                                
4  This section draws mainly on Mandaza, Holmes and Evans, (1998).
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arrangement such as CUmin and realise the even greater welfare benefits as under FT? Since deep integration
is not implied by the FT option, the FT option may not be as attractive as it appears from the orders of
magnitude of gains relative to CUmin shown in Table 4.
7.5  Potent ia l  Terms of  Trade Effects
In addition to the exclusion of the benefits from deep integration in the FT option, the attractions of FT are
tempered by potential terms of trade costs, noted by Kaplinsky (1998) for the East Asian case. Kaplinsky
found that the newer East Asian NICs suffered terms of trade problems compared with the older NICs. This
suggested that the older East Asian NICs were better able to offset any terms of trade problems in particular
product lines by constantly upgrading products for niche marketing. In the SADC context, the effects on
welfare of low export elasticities were much greater for FT than for CUmin. Put the other way around, a
CUmin with deep integration would be less likely to face adverse terms of trade effects that FT. It would
also have a greater potential capacity to assist SADC exporters to constantly upgrade their products to
counter adverse terms of trade pressures.
8   CONCLUDING REMARKS
Any conclusions much bear in mind the preliminary nature of the CGE modelling exercise and the key data
deficiencies that have important bearing on policy choices. With all of the qualifications and cautionary
remarks, the key conclusions from this paper are:
· There are important welfare benefits, both static and dynamic, to be gained from the SADC FTA were
this to be implemented as intended
· It is unlikely that the intended FTA can be implemented because of unenforceable rules of origin. Thus,
integration according to the actual FTA will end up being like a CU with the minimum tariff on each
traded item from the member countries operating as the common external tariff for that item, the CUmin.
· There is substantial trade diversion associated with the 'intended' FTA, although trade creation dominates.
The CUmin has very little trade diversion.
· Moving on to a CUmin offers many advantages for SADC. The welfare gains would be dramatically
increased, both static and dynamic. In particular, the opportunities for long run gains from a rule-based
system of deep integration are likely to greatly increase.
· Full FT appears to offer some advantages in terms of welfare gains compared with CUmin However, FT
will miss the benefits of deep integration and it may not be as effective in providing firms with an
enabling environment that may assist in offsetting potentially adverse terms of trade effects.
· This paper is only the beginning of a policy relevant research that can be informed by a CGE model of
SADC. This suggests that there is likely to be a high pay-off to further development of economic policy
modelling of the Southern African region. In particular, there is scope for further research into the
18
employment and welfare charges from the options considered when full labour market mobility is not
assumed or full employment maintained, measured in terms of wage units. Such work can only
complement both case studies and political economy research on micro and institutional aspects of the
path toward regional integration.
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APPENDIX
Table  A.1 :  Wel fare  Ef fec ts ,  FTA Large  Market  Clear ing  Taxes  and Subs id ies
      SADC tariffs                ROW tariff Final Consumer Customs Lump Sum TOTAL %  Final ToT % SADC
pre  post pre post Demand Surplus Revenue Tax GAINS Demand Pe/Pm Imports
Angola 10.1 0.0 10.8 10.8 6974 28.4 -34.1 14.7 8.9 0.13 0.999 20.19
Botswana 0.5 0.0 11.8 11.8 3386 13.1 -8.2 -10.1 -5.2 -0.15 1.001 0.16
Lesotho 1.5 0.0 11.7 11.7 1279 15.4 -13.0 2.7 5.1 0.39 0.999 0.41
Malawi 21.8 0.0 20.6 20.6 1886 72.3 -44.9 26.0 53.4 2.83 0.999 22.72
Mauritius 24.5 0.0 22.7 22.7 2525 67.5 -38.3 -21.3 8.0 0.32 1.004 25.02
Mozambique 19.5 0.0 12.0 12.0 1589 66.1 -59.7 6.8 13.1 0.83 0.989 18.96
Namibia 0.1 0.0 12.6 12.6 1959 1.0 -0.7 -0.8 -0.6 -0.03 1.000 0.08
RSA 6.5 0.0 5.6 5.6 108822 108.2 -87.7 -6.6 13.9 0.01 1.001 20.83
Swaziland 0.1 0.0 6.3 6.3 1035 3.1 -0.5 1.3 4.0 0.38 1.003 0.31
Tanzania 21.9 0.0 19.0 19.0 3315 7.0 -5.8 1.0 2.2 0.07 1.000 33.62
Zambia 14.0 0.0 11.4 11.4 1898 14.6 -48.3 2.0 -31.7 -1.67 0.998 18.82
Zimbabwe 18.8 0.0 15.8 15.8 4240 118.9 -94.0 56.0 80.9 1.91 0.979 32.47
SADC 5.7 0.0 9.3 9.3 138909 515.6 -435.2 71.6 152.0 0.11 0.999 9.36
Notes:
$USm average 1991-3 for financial variables
Imports and exports valued fob
Tariffs import weighted, most recent year
Lump sum tax adjusted to maintain internal balances, or labour market equilibrium
Table  A.2 :  Wel fare  Ef fec ts ,  FTA Low Market  Clear ing  Taxes  and Subs id ies
      SADC tariffs                ROW tariff Final Consumer Customs Lump Sum TOTAL %  Final ToT % SADC
pre  post pre post Demand Surplus Revenue Tax GAINS Demand Pe/Pm Imports
Angola 10.1 0.0 10.8 10.8 6974 24.5 -34.3 13.8 4.1 0.06 0.998 20.04
Botswana 0.5 0.0 11.8 11.8 3386 18.1 -8.1 -5.7 4.2 0.12 1.003 0.25
Lesotho 1.5 0.0 11.7 11.7 1279 15.7 -13.0 2.6 5.2 0.41 1.000 0.47
Malawi 21.8 0.0 20.6 20.6 1886 70.0 -45.0 26.4 51.4 2.73 0.999 22.54
Mauritius 24.5 0.0 22.7 22.7 2525 82.8 -37.2 -12.6 32.9 1.30 1.011 24.84
Mozambique 19.5 0.0 12.0 12.0 1589 48.0 -60.7 6.6 -6.2 -0.39 0.976 17.85
Namibia 0.1 0.0 12.6 12.6 1959 0.3 -0.7 -0.6 -1.0 -0.05 1.000 0.03
RSA 6.5 0.0 5.6 5.6 108822 137.7 -85.4 4.6 57.0 0.05 1.002 20.71
Swaziland 0.1 0.0 6.3 6.3 1035 4.7 -0.5 1.3 5.6 0.54 1.005 0.46
Tanzania 21.9 0.0 19.0 19.0 3315 6.7 -5.8 1.2 2.2 0.06 1.000 33.52
Zambia 14.0 0.0 11.4 11.4 1898 14.4 -48.6 2.0 -32.2 -1.69 0.992 18.20
Zimbabwe 18.8 0.0 15.8 15.8 4240 131.1 -91.6 62.2 101.8 2.40 0.976 31.37
SADC 5.7 0.0 9.3 9.3 138909 554.0 -430.8 101.8 225.0 0.16 1.000 9.21
Notes:
$USm average 1991-3 for financial variables
Imports and exports valued fob
Tariffs import weighted, most recent year
Lump sum tax adjusted to maintain internal balances, or labour market equilibrium
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Table  A.3 :  Wel fa re  Ef fec ts ,  CUmin Large  Market  Clear ing  Taxes  and Subs id ies
      SADC tariffs                ROW tariff Final Consumer Customs Lump Sum TOTAL %  Final ToT % SADC
pre  CUmin pre CUmin Demand Surplus Revenue Tax GAINS Demand Pe/Pm Trade
Angola 10.1 0.0 10.8 5.4 6974 132.9 -107.4 62.5 87.9 1.26 0.999 13.13
Botswana 0.5 0.0 11.8 3.2 3386 52.3 -29.6 -2.7 20.0 0.59 1.007 -0.60
Lesotho 1.5 0.0 11.7 3.7 1279 21.4 -19.3 3.2 5.3 0.41 0.999 -0.31
Malawi 21.8 0.0 20.6 4.3 1886 144.6 -87.0 57.2 114.8 6.09 0.996 17.46
Mauritius 24.5 0.0 22.7 3.8 2525 310.4 -300.5 6.9 16.8 0.67 0.985 21.16
Mozambique 19.5 0.0 12.0 3.8 1589 114.2 -97.6 11.8 28.4 1.79 0.979 17.01
Namibia 0.1 0.0 12.6 4.2 1959 20.3 -10.4 2.6 12.5 0.64 1.005 -0.40
RSA 6.5 0.0 5.6 2.8 108822 329.8 -373.2 132.4 89.1 0.08 0.995 16.09
Swaziland 0.1 0.0 6.3 3.1 1035 5.5 -1.9 -0.2 3.4 0.33 1.004 0.80
Tanzania 21.9 0.0 19.0 5.0 3315 204.0 -154.9 17.1 66.2 2.00 0.981 26.80
Zambia 14.0 0.0 11.4 3.7 1898 154.5 -80.5 39.1 113.2 5.96 0.999 18.39
Zimbabwe 18.8 0.0 15.8 3.3 4240 276.0 -229.6 67.4 113.8 2.68 0.957 24.76
SADC 5.7 0.0 9.3 3.3 138909 1766.0 -1491.9 397.3 671.4 0.48 0.994 7.20
Notes:
$USm average 1991-3 for financial variables
Imports and exports valued fob
Tariffs import weighted, most recent year
Lump sum tax adjusted to maintain internal balances, or labour market equilibrium
Table  A.4 :  Wel fa re  Ef fec ts ,  CUmin Low Market  Clear ing  Taxes  and Subs id ies
      SADC tariffs                ROW tariff Final Consumer Customs Lump Sum TOTAL %  Final ToT % SADC
pre  CUmin pre CUmin Demand Surplus Revenue Tax GAINS Demand Pe/Pm Trade
Angola 10.1 0.0 10.8 5.4 6974 124.7 -107.8 65.6 82.5 1.18 0.996 13.62
Botswana 0.5 0.0 11.8 3.2 3386 66.9 -29.7 12.4 49.7 1.47 1.012 -0.16
Lesotho 1.5 0.0 11.7 3.7 1279 19.3 -19.3 2.8 2.8 0.22 0.996 -0.26
Malawi 21.8 0.0 20.6 4.3 1886 136.8 -87.1 56.5 106.1 5.63 0.986 16.96
Mauritius 24.5 0.0 22.7 3.8 2525 286.6 -302.1 33.1 17.5 0.69 0.973 19.06
Mozambique 19.5 0.0 12.0 3.8 1589 81.3 -98.1 13.3 -3.6 -0.22 0.954 15.06
Namibia 0.1 0.0 12.6 4.2 1959 23.2 -10.4 6.8 19.6 1.00 1.006 -0.39
RSA 6.5 0.0 5.6 2.8 108822 89.7 -380.0 78.4 -211.8 -0.19 0.988 16.03
Swaziland 0.1 0.0 6.3 3.1 1035 5.0 -1.9 -0.2 2.8 0.27 1.004 0.82
Tanzania 21.9 0.0 19.0 5.0 3315 167.7 -155.8 22.6 34.5 1.04 0.960 26.37
Zambia 14.0 0.0 11.4 3.7 1898 127.3 -80.7 34.5 81.0 4.27 0.988 17.75
Zimbabwe 18.8 0.0 15.8 3.3 4240 244.8 -231.4 69.7 83.1 1.96 0.961 27.52
SADC 5.7 0.0 9.3 3.3 138909 1373.2 -1504.4 395.4 264.2 0.19 0.988 7.32
Notes:
$USm average 1991-3 for financial variables
Imports and exports valued fob
Tariffs import weighted, most recent year
Lump sum tax adjusted to maintain internal balances, or labour market equilibrium
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Table  A.5 :  Wel fare  Ef fec ts ,  FT Large  Market  Clear ing  Taxes  and Subs id ies
      SADC tariffs                ROW tariff Final Consumer Customs Lump Sum TOTAL %  Final ToT % SADC
pre  post pre post Demand Surplus Revenue Tax GAINS Demand Pe/Pm Imports
Angola 10.1 0.0 10.8 0.0 6974 233.5 -196.0 107.7 145.2 2.08 0.998 9.45
Botswana 0.5 0.0 11.8 0.0 3386 77.4 -38.8 5.0 43.6 1.29 1.012 -0.55
Lesotho 1.5 0.0 11.7 0.0 1279 24.9 -23.1 3.5 5.3 0.41 1.002 -0.59
Malawi 21.8 0.0 20.6 0.0 1886 163.4 -99.8 65.4 129.0 6.84 0.996 16.40
Mauritius 24.5 0.0 22.7 0.0 2525 358.5 -363.6 12.6 7.5 0.30 0.981 20.07
Mozambique 19.5 0.0 12.0 0.0 1589 136.6 -117.4 15.6 34.8 2.19 0.976 16.27
Namibia 0.1 0.0 12.6 0.0 1959 34.1 -17.0 5.5 22.7 1.16 1.009 -0.45
RSA 6.5 0.0 5.6 0.0 108822 630.7 -775.2 287.2 142.6 0.13 0.989 14.19
Swaziland 0.1 0.0 6.3 0.0 1035 8.6 -3.5 -0.5 4.5 0.44 1.007 1.00
Tanzania 21.9 0.0 19.0 0.0 3315 263.9 -211.8 23.1 75.2 2.27 0.975 19.19
Zambia 14.0 0.0 11.4 0.0 1898 205.5 -98.1 49.5 156.9 8.26 0.999 17.77
Zimbabwe 18.8 0.0 15.8 0.0 4240 315.4 -273.6 67.7 109.5 2.58 0.956 23.01
SADC 5.7 0.0 9.3 0.0 138909 2452.4 -2218.0 642.2 876.6 0.63 0.991 6.50
Notes:
$USm average 1991-3 for financial variables
Imports and exports valued fob
Tariffs import weighted, most recent year
Lump sum tax adjusted to maintain internal balances, or labour market equilibrium
Table  A.6 :  Wel fare  Ef fec ts ,  FT Low Market  Clear ing  Taxes  and Subs id ies
      SADC tariffs                ROW tariff Final Consumer Customs Lump Sum TOTAL %  Final ToT % SADC
pre  post pre post Demand Surplus Revenue Tax GAINS Demand Pe/Pm Imports
Angola 10.1 0.0 10.8 0.0 6974 221.7 -196.0 112.2 137.8 1.98 0.993 10.49
Botswana 0.5 0.0 11.8 0.0 3386 102.6 -38.8 26.7 90.5 2.67 1.020 0.21
Lesotho 1.5 0.0 11.7 0.0 1279 22.9 -23.1 3.2 3.0 0.23 0.998 -0.48
Malawi 21.8 0.0 20.6 0.0 1886 155.0 -99.8 64.8 120.1 6.36 0.985 16.11
Mauritius 24.5 0.0 22.7 0.0 2525 327.5 -363.6 43.0 6.9 0.27 0.964 18.06
Mozambique 19.5 0.0 12.0 0.0 1589 99.9 -117.4 17.6 0.1 0.00 0.948 14.26
Namibia 0.1 0.0 12.6 0.0 1959 42.2 -17.0 12.9 38.1 1.94 1.013 -0.28
RSA 6.5 0.0 5.6 0.0 108822 159.4 -775.2 179.6 -436.3 -0.40 0.976 13.69
Swaziland 0.1 0.0 6.3 0.0 1035 7.8 -3.5 -0.6 3.7 0.36 1.006 1.07
Tanzania 21.9 0.0 19.0 0.0 3315 217.4 -211.8 29.6 35.2 1.06 0.946 18.78
Zambia 14.0 0.0 11.4 0.0 1898 170.9 -98.1 43.2 116.0 6.11 0.988 17.49
Zimbabwe 18.8 0.0 15.8 0.0 4240 270.6 -273.6 67.3 64.2 1.52 0.963 27.79
SADC 5.7 0.0 9.3 0.0 138909 1797.8 -2218.0 599.5 179.2 0.13 0.981 6.82
Notes:
$USm average 1991-3 for financial variables
Imports and exports valued fob
Tariffs import weighted, most recent year
Lump sum tax adjusted to maintain internal balances, or labour market equilibrium
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Table  A.7 :  FTA 7  Sector  d isaggregated  Resul ts :  % Change on Base
Large  Expor t  Elas t ic i t ies ,  Market  C lear ing  Taxes  and  Subs id ies
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Table  A.7  cont . :  FTA 7  Sec to r  Disaggregated Resul ts :  % Change on  Base
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Table  A.7  cont . :  FTA 7  Sec to r  Disaggregated Resul ts :  % Change on  Base
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Table  A.7  cont . :  FTA 7  Sec to r  Disaggregated Resul ts :  % Change on  Base
Notes: $USm average 1990-2 for financial variables; Government revenue excludes grants; '000' for employment Imports and exports valued fob; Average tariff uses import weights; D: Domestic demand;
SM: Import competing production; MS: imports from SADC; MR: Imports from the ROW; ES: Exports to SADC; ER: Exports to the ROW; dBOP: change in Balance of Payments;
L: Labour employed; CR: Customs Revenue; GR: Government Revenue; tMS1,M: Tariffs, SADC, initial, import weighted; tMS2,M: Tariffs, SADC, initial, import weighted, final; tMR1,M: Tariffs, SADC,
initial, import weighted, R: ROW.
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Table  A.8 :  CUmin 7  Sector  d isaggregated  Resul ts :  % Change  on  Base
Large  Expor t  Elas t ic i t ies ,  Market  C lear ing  Taxes  and  Subs id ies
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Table  A.8  Cont . :  C U m i n 7  Sec to r  Disaggregated Resul ts :  % Change on  Base
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Table  A.8  cont . :  CUmin  7  Sec to r  Disaggregated Resul ts :  % Change on  Base
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Table  A.8  cont . :  C U m i n 7  Sec to r  Disaggregated Resul ts :  % Change on  Base
Notes: $USm average 1990-2 for financial variables; Government revenue excludes grants; '000' for employment Imports and exports valued fob; Average tariff uses import weights; D: Domestic demand;
SM: Import competing production; MS: imports from SADC; MR: Imports from the ROW; ES: Exports to SADC; ER: Exports to the ROW; dBOP: change in Balance of Payments;
L: Labour employed; CR: Customs Revenue; GR: Government Revenue; tMS1,M: Tariffs, SADC, initial, import weighted; tMS2,M: Tariffs, SADC, initial, import weighted, final;  tMR1,M: Tariffs, SADC, initial, import weighted,
R: ROW.
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Table  A.9 :  FT 7  Sec tor  Disaggregated Resul ts :  % Change on  Base
Large  Expor t  Elas t ic i t ies ,  Market  C lear ing  Taxes  and  Subs id ies
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Table  A.9  cont . :  FT 7  Sec to r  Disaggregated Resul ts :  % Change on  Base
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Table  A.9  cont . :  FT 7  Sec to r  Disaggregated Resul ts :  % Change on  Base
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Table  A.9  cont . :  FT 7  Sec to r  Disaggregated Resul ts :  % Change on  Base
Notes: $USm average 1990-2 for financial variables; Government revenue excludes grants; '000' for employment Imports and exports valued fob; Average tariff uses import weights; D: Domestic demand;
SM: Import competing production; MS: imports from SADC; MR: Imports from the ROW; ES: Exports to SADC; ER: Exports to the ROW; dBOP: change in Balance of Payments;
L: Labour employed; CR: Customs Revenue; GR: Government Revenue; tMS1,M: Tariffs, SADC, initial, import weighted; tMS2,M: Tariffs, SADC, initial, import weighted, final;  tMR1,M:
Tariffs, SADC, initial, import weighted, R: ROW.
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS USED
CGE Computable General Equilibrium
CU Customs Union
CUavg Customs Union with external tariffs based on average tariffs for each traded item across
countries
Cumax Customs Union with external tariffs based on the traded item maximum tariff for each
traded item across member countries
CUmin Customs Union with external tariffs based on the traded item minimum tariff for each
traded item across member countries
FT Free Trade
FTA Free Trade Area
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP Gross Domestic Product
IDRC International Development Research Centre
MFN Most Favoured Nation
OR Open Regionalism
ROW Rest of the World
RTMSA Regional Trade Model of Southern Africa
SACU Southern African Customs Union
SADC Southern African Development Community
SADCC Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference
SAP Structural Adjustment Programme
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